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The interplay between traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading on complex networks has received increasing
attention in recent years. However, the control of traffic-driven epidemic spreading remains to be a challenging
problem. In this Brief Report, we propose a method to suppress traffic-driven epidemic outbreak by properly
removing some edges in a network. We find that the epidemic threshold can be enhanced by the targeted cutting
of links among large-degree nodes or edges with the largest algorithmic betweeness. In contrast, the epidemic
threshold will be reduced by the random edge removal. These findings are robust with respect to traffic-flow
conditions, network structures and routing strategies. Moreover, we find that the shutdown of targeted edges
can effectively release traffic load passing through large-degree nodes, rendering a relatively low probability of
infection to these nodes.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 05.70.Ln, 05.60.-k
Human society has always suffered from various viruses,
such as AIDS, H1N1 influenza and computer virus. As
the rapid development of complex network theory [1, 2],
much effort has been dedicated to understand dynamical pro-
cesses of epidemic spreading on complex networks in the past
decade [3–11]. Propagation is usually assumed to be driven by
reaction processes, in the sense that every infected node trans-
mits diseases to all its neighbors at each time step, producing
a diffusion of the epidemics in the population. However, in
many realistic situations, even when there is a link connect-
ing two nodes, infection will not propagate unless some kind
of traffic happens between the nodes. For example, a com-
puter virus can spread over Internet via email-exchanges. In
the absence of such data packet transmission, even if there is
a path linking two computers, an infected computer will not
be able to infect the other one. Another example is that air
transport tremendously accelerates the propagation of infec-
tious diseases among different countries.
The first attempt to incorporate traffic into epidemic spread-
ing is based on metapopulation model [12–19]. This frame-
work describes a set of spatially structured interacting sub-
populations as a network, whose links denote the traveling
path of individuals across subpopulations. Each subpopula-
tion consists of a large number of individuals. Recently, Mel-
oni et al. proposed another traffic-driven epidemic spread-
ing model [20], in which each node of a network represents
a router and the epidemic can spread between nodes by the
transport of information packets.
One of the most important issues in the study of epidemic
spreading is how to control the prevalence of infection. To
suppress the traffic-driven epidemic spreading, a variety of
strategies have been considered, such as the restriction of
traffic flow [21], the selection of routings [22] and heteroge-
neous curing rate [23], etc. In this Brief Report, we propose
a method to control traffic-driven epidemic spreading based
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on edge-removal strategies. The principle of edge-removal
strategies is to affect the spreading dynamics of epidemics (or
virus) by deleting some edges in the underlying network. It
has been recognized that edge-removal strategies can greatly
influence the dynamics of synchronization [24], evolutionary
games [25] and traffic [26]. In Ref. [27], Zhang et al. found
that, both random and targeted deletion of edges can sup-
press the outbreak of reaction-based epidemic. In contrast,
we will show that random and targeted edge-removal strate-
gies play different roles in the traffic-driven epidemic spread-
ing. Specifically, we have found that the random shutdown
of edges decreases the epidemic threshold, while the targeted
shutdown of edges increases the epidemic threshold.
Following the work of Meloni et al. [20], we incorporate
the traffic dynamics into the susceptible-infected-susceptible
model [28] of epidemic spreading as follows. In a network
of size N , at each time step, λN new packets are gener-
ated with randomly chosen sources and destinations, and each
node i can deliver at most Ci packets toward their destina-
tions. Packets are forwarded according to a given routing al-
gorithm. The queue length of each agent is assumed to be
unlimited. The first-in-first-out principle applies to the queue.
Each newly generated packet is placed at the end of the queue
of its source node. Once a packet reaches its destination, it
is removed from the system. Nodes can be in two discrete
states, either susceptible or infected. After a transient time,
the total number of delivered packets at each time will reach
a steady value. Subsequently, an initial fraction of nodes ρ0
is set to be infected (we choose ρ0 = 0.1 in our numerical
experiments). The infection spreads in the network through
packet exchanges. All packets queuing in an infected node
are infected, while all packets in a susceptible node are un-
infected. A susceptible node has the probability β of being
infected every time it receives an infected packet from any in-
fected neighboring nodes. With probability 1−β, the virus in
an infected packet will be cleaned by antivirus software in the
susceptible node. The infected nodes are recovered at rate µ
(here, we set µ = 1).
In the following, we carry out simulations systematically by
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Density of infected nodes ρ as a function
of the spreading rate β for the null (f = 0), RS (f = 0.3), BS
(f = 0.02) and DS (f = 0.02) cases. The packet-generation rate
λ = 1. Each curve is an average of 102 different realizations.
employing traffic-driven epidemic spreading on the Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) scale-free networks [29] with the shortest-path
routing algorithm [30, 31]. Initially, the size of BA network
is set to be N = 5000 and the average degree of the network
〈k〉 = 10. Moreover, we assume that the node delivering ca-
pacity is infinite, so that traffic congestion will not occur in
the network.
Three edge-removal strategies are considered respectively.
(I) The random strategy (RS): We randomly remove a frac-
tion f of edges from the network. (II) The betweenness-
based strategy (BS): We rank the edges in descending order
according to their algorithmic betweenness. The algorithmic
betweenness of an edge is the average number of packets pass-
ing through that edge at each time step in the steady state. We
close a proportion of edges at the top of the ranking list. (III)
The degree-based strategy (DS): We define the significance
Gij of an edge by the product of the degrees of two nodes i
and j at both sides of the edge, i.e., Gij = ki × kj . After
computing the significance of all edges, we rank the edges in
descending order according to their significance. A propor-
tion of edges at the top of the ranking list are removed from
the network. For all three strategies, disconnected networks
are avoided.
Figure 1 shows the density of infected nodes ρ as a function
of the spreading rate β for the null (f = 0, i.e., no edges
are shutdown during the epidemic spreading process), RS, BS
and DS cases. We observe that for each case, there exists an
epidemic threshold βc, beyond which the density of infected
nodes is nonzero and increases as β is increased. For β < βc,
the epidemic goes extinct and ρ = 0.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of βc(f) to βc(0) as a function of
the fraction of deleted edges f for the cases of RS, BS and
DS. Here βc(0) is the epidemic threshold for the null case and
βc(f) represents the epidemic threshold under the condition
that a fraction f of edges in the network are deleted. From
Fig. 2, we can see that βc(f)/βc(0) > 1 and βc(f)/βc(0) in-
10-3 10-2 10-1
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
c(f
)/
c(0
)
f
RS
BS
DS
FIG. 2: (Color online) The relative ratio βc(f)/βc(0) as a function
of the fraction of deleted edges f for RS, BS and DS. The packet-
generation rate λ = 1 and βc(0) ≃ 0.043. Each data point results
from an average over 102 different realizations. The curves are the-
oretical predictions according to Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The solid,
dashed, and dotted curves correspond to the theoretical predictions
for RS, BS and DS, respectively.
creases with the increment of f for the cases of BS and DS, in-
dicating that targeted edge-removal strategies can effectively
suppress the outbreak of epidemic. As shown in Fig. 2, com-
pared with that of the null case, the epidemic threshold can be
enhanced more than 50% when only one percent of targeted
edges are cutting-down. It is also noted that the epidemic
threshold in the case of DS is a little larger than that in the
case of BS, given that the same fraction of edges are deleted.
For RS, however, βc(f)/βc(0) is found to decrease as f in-
creases, demonstrating that the random edge-removal strategy
is failed to inhibit the spreading of epidemic, but rather en-
hances its propagation.
According to the analysis of Ref. [20], the epidemic thresh-
old for uncorrelated networks is
βc =
〈balg〉
〈b2alg〉
1
λN
, (1)
where balg is the algorithmic betweenness of a node [32, 33]
and 〈·〉 denotes the average of all nodes. The algorithmic be-
tweenness of a node is the number of packets passing through
that node when the packet-generation rate λ = 1/N [32, 33].
For the shortest-path routing protocol, the algorithmic be-
tweenness is equal to the topological betweenness (balg =
btop) and 〈balg〉 = 〈D〉/(N − 1), where 〈D〉 is the average
topological distance of a network. Here, the topological be-
tweenness of a node k is defined as
bktop =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
σij(k)
σij
, (2)
where σij is the total number of shortest paths going from i to
j, and σij(k) is the number of shortest paths going from i to j
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The algorithmic betweenness balg(k) as a
function of the original degree k for the null (f = 0), RS (f = 0.4),
BS (f = 0.06) and DS (f = 0.06) cases. Each data point results
from an average over 102 different realizations.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The dependence of the density of infected
nodes ρk on the original degree k for the null (f = 0), RS (f = 0.4),
BS (f = 0.06) and DS (f = 0.06) cases. In all cases, the packet-
generation rate λ = 1 and the density of infected nodes ρ ≃ 0.1.
Each data point results from an average over 102 different realiza-
tions.
and passing through k. The average topological distance of a
network is given by 〈D〉 =
∑
i6=j dij/[N(N − 1)], where dij
is the shortest distance between i and j. Combining Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2), we are able to calculate the theoretical values of
βc(f)/βc(0). In Fig. 2, we notice that the theoretical predic-
tions agree well with the numerical results.
To show how different edge-removal strategies affect traffic
flow on the nodes with different degrees, we display in Fig. 3
the dependence of algorithmic betweenness balg(k) on degree
k. Here the degree of a node is calculated before the imple-
mentation of deleting edges. From Fig. 3, one can see that for
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The epidemic threshold βc as a function of the
packet-generation rate λ for the null case (f = 0), the RS case (f =
0.06), the BS case (f = 0.06) and the DS case (f = 0.06). For all
cases, the delivery capacity of a node i is equal to its original degree,
that is Ci = ki. The arrows mark the critical packet-generating rates
λc. For the null case (f = 0), λc ≈ 0.7; For the RS case (f = 0.06),
λc ≈ 0.6; For the BS and DS cases (f = 0.06), λc ≈ 1.4. Each data
point results from an average over 102 different realizations.
both the null and RS cases, balg(k) increases as the increas-
ing of k, and the relationship between balg(k) and k follows
a power-law form as balg(k) ∼ kν . The exponent ν is almost
the same for the null and RS cases. In addition, we can also
observe that, for large values of k, balg(k) is much smaller in
the cases of BS and DS as compared to that in the cases of null
and RS. This point is understandable, since the targeted dele-
tion of edges makes many transport paths bypass large-degree
nodes and reroute via moderate-degree nodes, hence decreas-
ing the algorithmic betweenness of those hub nodes. Conse-
quently, as shown in Fig. 3, the highest values of balg(k) are
refered to those medium-degree nodes in the cases of BS and
DS.
We define ρk as the density of infected nodes of degree k.
Figure 4 features the dependence of ρk on k for the null, RS,
BS and DS cases. Combining Figs. 3 and 4, we can observe
that the algorithmic betweenness is positively correlated with
the risk of being infected. As shown in Fig. 4, ρk increases as
k increases for the null and RS cases. Compared with these
two cases, the probability of being infected for large-degree
nodes is greatly reduced in the cases of BS and DS.
We now turn our attention to a more realistic situation
where the node delivering capacity is finite. The main dif-
ference with the infinite-capacity case is the possibility of the
emergence of traffic congestion in the network, which oc-
curs when the packet-generating rate exceeds a critical value
λc [33]. Specially, we set the delivery capacity of a node i
to be equal to its original degree, that is Ci = ki. The epi-
demic threshold βc as a function of the packet-generation rate
λ for the null, RS, BS and DS cases are depicted in Fig. 5. We
see that βc decreases and stabilizes at a constant value as λ
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FIG. 6: (Color online) (a) The relative ratio βc(f)/βc(0) as a func-
tion of the fraction of deleted edges f for the RS, BS and DS cases.
The Internet at the autonomous system level and the shortest-path
routing are applied. The packet-generation rate λ = 0.25 and
βc(0) ≃ 0.045. (b) The relative ratio βc(f)/βc(0) as a function
of the fraction of deleted edges f for the RS, BS and DS cases. The
BA networks and the random-walk routing are used. The packet-
generation rate λ = 0.02 and βc(0) ≃ 0.058. For both (a) and (b),
the node delivering capacity is infinite. Each data point results from
an average over 102 different realizations.
increases. We also observe that, the random-deletion strategy
cannot increases the epidemic threshold while the targeted-
deletion strategies (BS and DS) can effectively enhance the
epidemic threshold, regardless of that the traffic is in the free-
flow state (λ < λc) or in the congested state (λ > λc).
Finally, we examine the performance of our proposed
strategies in controlling epidemic spreading by considering
our model on different network structures and with alterna-
tive routing protocols. In Fig. 6(a), we present the simula-
tion results for different edge-removal strategies on the Inter-
net at the autonomous system level [34], where the network
size N = 6474 and the average degree 〈k〉 = 3.88 before cut-
ting edges. The packets are delivered following the shortest-
path routing. In Fig. 6(b), we carry out our studies on the
BA networks, where packets are forwarded according to a
random-walk routing algorithm, i.e., a packet is delivered to
a randomly selected neighbor. For the random-walk routing,
the algorithmic betweenness balg of a node is proportional to
its degree [35, 36]. As shown in Fig. 6, the conclusion that
the suppression of epidemic outbreak by the targeted edge-
removal strategies and the promotion of epidemic outbreak by
the random edge-removal strategy, is still valid.
In conclusion, we have studied the impact of edge-removal
strategies on traffic-driven epidemic spreading. The shutdown
of links in terms of their algorithmic betweeness or of links
connecting large degree nodes, are found to be quite efficient
in suppressing epidemic spreading. Contrary to previous stud-
ies on reaction-based epidemic [27], we find that the random
shutdown of edges accelerates the outbreak of traffic-driven
epidemic. Furthermore, compared to the deletion of edges
with the largest algorithmic betweeness, the shutdown of links
connecting large-degree nodes is proved to be more effective
in enhancing the epidemic threshold. Thus, according to our
present studies, the targeted link-closing method can be used
to control the spreading of computer virus in the Internet. For
example, we can temporarily close links between large-degree
nodes at the time of virus outbreak, and recover these links
after virus is eliminated from the system, which could be re-
alized readily by special softwares.
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